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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FINDING AN UNLIKELY COMBATANT IN THE WAR AGAINST
RANSOMWARE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROVIDERS TO UTILIZE
OFF-SITE DATA BACKUP WITHIN THE HIPAA OMNIBUS AND
HITECH AMENDMENTS

ABSTRACT
Each day the health care sector is subjected to an onslaught of thousands of
ransomware virus attacks which attempt to capture a provider’s IT operations
until a ransom is paid to the hacker. Apart from monetary, functional, and civil
liability considerations, compromised health systems that contain electronic
patient health information could expose a provider to legal liability under
multiple HIPAA laws. This article will explore how recent amendments made to
HIPAA, particularly under the Omnibus and HITECH Acts, incentivize
providers to obtain legal, functional, and policy-based benefits by utilizing offsite data backup business associates as part of their cybersecurity defense
strategy in the escalating war against ransomware.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of big data where electronically protected health information
(ePHI) is dominating the health care industry, “ransomware” attacks are
increasingly becoming an issue for health care providers. 1 Ransomware is a form
of malware, which takes the infected system and either blocks software usage
on a computer, encrypts the computer’s data, or both. 2 If the owner of the
infected system does not pay a ransom, then she will not regain access to her
computer and all files may be lost or, even worse, taken by hackers. These
attacks have been occurring almost 4,000 times daily in the health care sector
since the beginning of 2016. 3
The frequency of ransomware attacks is increasing. For providers
specifically, data systems held ransom for just a few minutes could lead to
enormous monetary losses in both a functional and legal sense. When an attack
encrypts a provider’s data, there is a loss of functionality in how the provider
makes money, a reputational hit, and numerous civil and government lawsuits
coming from incidents that occur while the systems are down, such as losing
ePHI. Perhaps the biggest consequence facing providers are the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) civil monetary sanctions
flowing from the 2009 HIPAA amendments. 4 The civil monetary cap per
HIPAA violation is now $1.5 million. 5 Additionally, providers that are not
properly prepared incur a financial cost by paying the ransom. In some cases,
providers have already done so, finding it was in their best interest to resume
business functions and pay the hacker’s fee. 6 Given these serious ramifications,
it is critical that health care entities dealing in ePHI develop strategies to protect
their legal liability before, during, and after a ransomware attack. Accordingly,
Congress has provided amendments to HIPAA, which providers should
carefully consider when constructing their cybersecurity strategy. Particularly,
four points from the Omnibus and Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act amendments are crucial to ransomware
considerations: (1) The maximum annual cap for civil monetary penalties

1. Kacy Zurkus, The Rise of Ransomware in Healthcare, CSO (July 11, 2016),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3091080/security/the-rise-of-ransomware-in-healthcare.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
2. KEVIN SAVAGE ET AL., SECURITY RESPONSE: THE EVOLUTION OF RANSOMWARE 6
(2015), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/
the-evolution-of-ransomware.pdf.
3. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET: Ransomware and HIPAA 1 (2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/RansomwareFactSheet.pdf.
4. Jessica J. Wilkes, Comment, The Creation of HIPAA Culture: Prioritizing Privacy
Paranoia Over Patient Care, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1213, 1227 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2013).
5. Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1228; 45 C.F.R. § 160.404.
6. Brittany Meiling, A New Health Threat: Ransomware Attacks Target Hospitals, Holding
Critical Patient Data Hostage, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Jun. 6, 2016, at 16.
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(CMPs) has increased to five million dollars; 7 (2) business associates are now
directly liable to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for
HIPAA violations; 8 (3) the definition of business associates has expanded to
encompass any “subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits
protected health information”; 9 and (4) assessment of the proper CMP charged
against the provider has changed to a newly formulated tier structure dependent
on culpability and expediency in curing the violation. 10
This paper will argue that in response to the HIPAA Omnibus and HITECH
amendments, health care providers should subcontract off-site data backup
business associates to obtain legal, practical, and policy-based advantages in the
ongoing battle against ransomware. As a primer, I will explain ransomware, its
prevalence in health care, why it has become so ubiquitous generally, and the
best practices applied to combat the cyberattacks thus far. Many providers have
enacted incident response procedures, staff training, and other preventative
practices such as anti-malware programs. 11 However, most of these strategies
serve little use once a hacker has instigated an attack. In the third section, I will
explore the 2013 HIPAA Omnibus amendments as well as the HITECH
amendments, specifically focusing on their language towards business
associates and liability. Before the Omnibus changes, almost all legal
responsibility went to the provider regardless of their business associates’
activities. With new amendments, there are incentives to outsource highly
technological procedures to those who can perform them best and do so without
increasing exposure to the provider itself. I will argue under the Omnibus
Amendments a significant share of legal liability will pass to a third-party
business associate in the event of a ransomware breach while concurrently
reducing the sanction placed on the health care provider.
The fourth and fifth sections of this paper will explain off-site data backup
as well as the legal, practical, and policy-based benefits that follow. Legally, I
will explore how shifts in CMPs and certain definitional changes have
incentivized using off-site data backup providers. I will also explore the practical
advantages from the practice of having an off-site backup, including providing
the highest quality care, minimizing administrative burdens, and continuing
revenue-generating operations. This method essentially allows the provider to

7. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404; Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2016).
8. 45 C.F.R. § 160.402.
9. Id. § 160.103.
10. Id. § 160.408.
11. Jennifer L. Rathburn & Jennifer J. Hennessy, Top Ten Health Law Issues of 2016:
Cybersecurity, AM. HEALTH LAWS. ASS’N CONNECTIONS, Feb. 2016, at 14; MURUGIAH
SOUPPAYA & KAREN SCARFONE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., SPECIAL PUBL’N 800-83 REVISION 1, GUIDE TO MALWARE INCIDENT PREVENTION AND
HANDLING FOR DESKTOPS AND LAPTOPS ix (2013).
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resume functions where it left before the attack, to do so without paying the
ransom, and to abandon the hacker with encrypted data. Here, I will use a
comparative study of an attack on Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center and
a separate attack on Alvarado Hospital Medical Center to demonstrate the
benefits of having a robust off-site data backup system in place and how it is
best to leave the technological jobs to the industries most knowledgeable about
the subject. Finally, I will explore the policy-based advantages of using off-site
business associates, such as removing incentives for ransomware attackers and
protecting patient confidence in the ability of health care providers, to protect
sensitive information.
The final section concludes that the HIPAA Omnibus and HITECH
amendments have allowed an opportunity for hospitals to combat a
technological threat occurring daily and the legal, practical, and policy-based
advantages gained from using an off-site data backup are far too profitable to
ignore.
II. BACKGROUND: RANSOMWARE IN HEALTH CARE
The first step to developing a strategy against ransomware is to understand
what it is. Ransomware has been identified by HHS as a virus intended to
damage or disable computer systems with the distinct characteristic of
attempting to block the system’s user from accessing data. 12 It is important to
note that there are two forms of ransomware in circulation today. The most
common type is called crypto-ransomware which blocks access to files by
encrypting the system’s data. 13 In theory, if the provider pays the ransom, then
the hacker decrypts the data instantly, but in reality, the hacker could just
demand more money. The second type of ransomware is called locker
ransomware, which locks down the operating system or particular computer
programs so that the user may not access the data inside those programs. 14 This
paper will focus solely on crypto-ransomware.
A detailed understanding of the intricacies of crypto-ransomware are
unnecessary to combat the virus, but every provider should have a basic
knowledge of the anatomy of such an attack. Crypto-ransomware begins with an
initial infection of some technological device linked to the provider’s network. 15
The ransomware installs itself on the device and establishes permissions to start
automatically every time the computer boots up. 16 Once attached to the device,
the ransomware sends a message to the hacker who is responsible for the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 1.
SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
Id.
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attack. 17 A technological “handshake” occurs between the hacker and the
ransomware, creating an encrypted key that is stored on the hacker’s server. 18
Once the hacker has the key, the ransomware begins encrypting all the files it
can find. 19 After the hacker has control of the provider’s records, the hacker
demands a ransom in return for the key that unlocks the files. 20
Surprisingly, ransomware has existed since 1989. 21 It is only recently that
users of the malware have turned their attention toward medical data. This data
has become more susceptible to attacks because protected health information
has become a currency on the black market, possessing far more value than a
credit card number or other personally identifying information. 22 An
individual’s medical records contain vast intelligence on their personal life
including a social security number, previous and current addresses, names of
siblings and children, and job history. 23 This type of record contains much more
information and is much more valuable than a basic number generated from a
credit card hack. 24 As such, Medicare or Medicaid records have been selling for
$500 a-piece, which some experts estimate could be up to ten times the worth of
a credit card number on the black market. 25
The ransomware plague has infected the health care sector because of the
value of protected health information. HHS reports a 300% increase from attacks
in 2015 alone. 26 A separate report by Raytheon/Websense indicates that health
care providers are 4.5 times more likely to face a crypto-ransomware attack than
other industries. 27 Facing daily ransomware threats and severe CMPs, health
care providers have developed some general practices that help, but by no means
eradicate, the crisis. 28 For starters, it is commonly advised that providers protect
their systems with some form of anti-malware. 29 While this is a necessary

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
21. Zurkus, supra note 1, at 3; Nsikan Akpan, Has Health Care Hacking Become an
Epidemic?, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/
has-health-care-hacking-become-an-epidemic/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
22. RAYTEHON & WEBSENSE, 2015 INDUSTRY DRILL-DOWN REPORT: HEALTHCARE 4
(2015),
https://www.websense.com/assets/reports/report-2015-industry-drill-down-healthcareen.pdf; Akpan, supra note 21.
23. Akpan, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 1 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET
AL., HOW TO PROTECT YOUR NETWORKS FROM RANSOMWARE 2 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-ccips/file/872771/download).
27. RAYTEHON & WEBANESE, supra note 22, at 9.
28. See id. at 7.
29. See Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
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precaution, studies of ransomware attacks show that hackers may enter through
periphery devices that do not have malware protection, such as cell phones. 30
Another practice implemented by health care providers is to encrypt patient
data. 31 While also helpful, this practice serves little use in a crypto-ransomware
attack, where a hacker has, in fact, encoded the provider’s already-encrypted
data. Thus, the encryption method blocks the hacker from accessing the data
initially, but it does not help the user gain access to data held for ransom. 32
Another consideration regarding hospital encryption is its effectiveness at
preventing the hacker from gaining access to ePHI and thereby undermining the
value of those records for resale on the black market. Experts maintain
unencrypted data has been a huge reason behind the majority of health care
breaches partially because it is more difficult for hackers to retrieve and resell
valuable patient information on the black market. 33 Assumedly, hackers may
continue ransomware operations under the theory a provider will pay the ransom
to get its records back. However, being able to prevent a profitable black market
transaction of ePHI demonstrates the value of hospital encryption. While
encryption is necessary for a hospital’s defense strategy, it is not enough by itself
to completely deter a hacker. Additional preventative practices such as off-site
data backup are required. Other strategies recommended by HHS are conducting
risk analysis assessments and training hospital staff to detect and report probable
ransomware attacks to the proper people. 34
Another suggested practice that health care providers were reluctant to latch
on to because of the potential liability connected to a third party not controlled
by the provider was having a reliable backup system of all the patient data with
an off-site contractor. 35 In this situation, a third party maintains regular data
backups of a provider’s ePHI at an off-site server that, in theory, separates a
copy of the ePHI from the crypto-ransomware infection. 36 Some reports in the
early years of contracted business associates showed they were getting hacked
more frequently than the actual providers themselves. 37 Moreover, before the
Omnibus law, the health care provider incurred all legal liability for a breach of
ePHI even if it occurred at a business associate’s off-site location. 38 With
exponential advances in information technology, data backup providers and

30. Id.
31. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 7.
32. See SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
33. See, e.g., RAYTHEON & WEBANESE, supra note 22, at 4.
34. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 1–2.
35. See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1215.
36. See, e.g., Joyce L. T. Chang, The Dark Cloud of Convenience: How the HIPAA Omnibus
Rules Fail to Protect Electronic Personal Health Information, 34 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 119, 135
(2013).
37. Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1231–32.
38. Id. at 1231.
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other information technology business associates have become better at
protecting ePHI. 39 This is likely because business associates are now directly
liable to HHS for incredibly high CMPs in case of a breach, which give data
protection vendors an additional incentive to provide the strongest protection
possible. 40 No single practice for fighting against ransomware is dispositive, but
rather a collection of methods that fit the provider’s personal risk-benefit
analysis should be implemented to fight the daily technology battle of protecting
patient data. After the Omnibus and HITECH amendments, using an off-site data
backup business associate to protect ePHI should be the foundation of every
health care provider’s collection of practices to defend against ransomware. 41
III. OMNIBUS HIPAA LAW AND HITECH AMENDMENTS
On January 25, 2013, Congress enacted several changes to the HIPAA
Omnibus law. Three of these changes significantly altered the way health care
providers develop their internal policies to fight ransomware. 42 First, the new
rules substantially raised the CMPs placed on health care organizations for
patient privacy violations including ransomware breaches. 43 It also made
business associates directly liable to HHS for their violations. 44 Congress also
made numerous definitional changes by expanding who is accountable for
HIPAA violations and what constitutes a breach of ePHI. The term “business
associate” now encompasses third parties with whom hospitals, working with
ePHI, contract. 45 The definition of “breach” has also expanded to encompass
even a risk of ePHI disclosure or improper use of such information as determined
through a risk assessment analysis. 46 This is a significant change from the
previous definition of breach, which was any event that “compromises the
security or privacy of the protected health information such that the use or

39. Dan Turkel, Even the Best Antivirus Likely Can’t Save Your Files from a Ransomware
Infection, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-ransomwarewith-antivirus-2016-1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
40. Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1229.
41. Ann Killilea & Michael G. Morgan, Guidance on Ransomware Attacks under HIPAA and
State Data Breach Notification Laws, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Aug. 8, 2016), http://1npdf9.
cloudapp.net/pdfrenderer.svc/v1/ABCpdf9/GetRenderedPdfByUrl//HIPAA%20Randsomeware%
20Attacks%20State%20Data%20Breach.pdf/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.mwe.com%2fen%2ftho
ught-leadership%2fpublications%2f2016%2f08%2fhipaa-randsomeware-attacks-state-databreach%3fpdf%3d1&attachment=false.pdf.
42. Kevin Twidwell & Brianne McClafferty, New HIPAA Rules Go into Effect: Lawyers Need
to up Their Game in Protecting Private Health Care Information, MONT. LAW., Dec.–Jan. 2013,
at 14; Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1229–30.
43. 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (proposed Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160,
164).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 5566–67.
46. Id. at 5640.
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disclosure poses a significant risk of financial, reputational or other harm to the
individual.” 47 These definitional changes concerning who is liable and what
triggers liability incentivize providers to create even more detailed cybersecurity
plans and to share the risk of CMPs among business associates.
The financial changes for HIPAA sanctions also act as a significant
incentive for health care organizations to avoid violations. The new cap for
CMPs committed by a provider either knowingly or neglectfully is set at $1.5
million. 48 A health care provider can quickly reach the cap, considering that
every unauthorized disclosure of ePHI may constitute not just one but many
violations. 49 Because of this possibility, HHS has to assess the penalty amount
based upon both the nature and the extent of the offense. 50 Crypto-ransomware
attacks can easily compromise entire databases of ePHI. 51 It is therefore easy to
see why providers increasingly worry about fines aggregating uncontrollably in
the absence of a robust cybersecurity plan.
After the Omnibus amendments, business associates including data services
are directly liable for breaches and HIPAA violations. 52 Thus, business
associates, like providers, potentially face a $1.5 million CMP cap should they
choose to contract with a provider. 53 Not only can the business associate
experience monetary damages but also reputational harm. The infamous “Wall
of Shame” at HHS publicly exposes any breach of protected health information
which affects over 500 people. 54 For a data backup company whose revenue is
derived almost exclusively from its ability to defend and store information, a
national public reprimand highlighting its failure to successfully perform this
task can lead to severe reputational harm. This amendment, therefore,
incentivizes better security of ePHI, as it is in the associate’s best interest to
ensure compliance with HIPAA standards.
The expansion of direct liability for business associates additionally helps to
address the issue of lacksadasical third-party security of ePHI. One biannual
study of health care provider facilities suggests that business associates

47. Id. at 5639.
48. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5583.
49. Id. at 5584.
50. HIPAA Violations & Enforcement, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/practicemanagement/hipaa-violations-enforcement (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
51. Loretta Duncan & Brian Johnson, Ransomware Attacks, Brief Notifications, and Security
Rule Compliance: What You Need to Know Now, SVMIC SENTINEL 7 (Sept. 2016), https://www.sv
mic.com/Home/media/29938/sentinel-september-2016.pdf.
52. 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.
53. Id.
54. Jessica Davis, HHS Overhauls ‘Wall of Shame’ Breach Reporting Website, HEALTHCARE
IT NEWS (July 26, 2017, 11:29 AM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hhs-overhauls-wallshame-breach-reporting-website (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
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previously constituted the most significant percentage of data breaches. 55
Furthermore, this study indicates a correlation between that portion of data
breaches and the fact that those business associates were not held liable for their
security measures. 56 Given this statistical framework, providers before the
amendments were understandably reluctant to take on a contract with a business
associate to backup ePHI. Not only was the provider liable for breaches caused
by the business associate, but it was also responsible for conducting regular
reviews and risk analysis assessments of the associate to ensure compliance. 57
This process resulted in a tremendous cost for the provider in oversight of the
business associate with little to no reward regarding ePHI protection. 58
Finally, another critical amendment is the tier structure for CMPs, created
in the 2009 HITECH Act. 59 Mostly, penalties for violations of the HIPAA
Security Rule vary based on the provider’s culpability. 60 The changes
distinguish fault into four categories. 61 To meet the lowest penalty level of
“unknowing,” the provider must not have known and reasonably should not have
known of the impending incident. 62 The second tier, labeled “reasonable cause,”
applies to providers and business associates who knew or reasonably should
have known but did not act with “willful neglect.” 63 The highest two penalty
category refers to entities which act with “willful neglect.” 64 If the violation was
the result of an entity’s conscious disregard or reckless indifference on the
matter, they will fall into one of these categories. Penalties of this type are
lessened, however, for providers who correct the violation within thirty days of
discovering what occurred. 65 This tiered structure incentivizes providers and
business associates to develop stronger security policies to protect ePHI. The
Secretary of HHS is also limited within the bill from enforcing CMPs against
providers who do not act with willful neglect and correct the violation within

55. See Heather Landi, Study: 30 Percent of Patient Data Breaches Involve Business
Associates, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com
/news-item/cybersecurity/study-30-percent-patient-data-breaches-involve-business-associates
(last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
56. See KROLL ADVISORY SOLS., 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT: SECURITY OF PATIENT
DATA 6 (2012), https://csbweb01.uncw.edu/people/CummingsJ/classes/MIS534/Articles/Previous
%20Articles/Ch6SecurityReport.pdf.
57. 45 C.F.R. § 164.302–08 (2013).
58. KROLL ADVISORY SOLS., supra note 56, at 28–35.
59. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2016).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 17939.
65. Id.
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thirty days. 66 This limitation demonstrates the incentive for a well thought out
and responsive cybersecurity strategy on the part of providers. 67
Four different amendments, three to the Omnibus HIPAA law and one to the
HITECH Act, when considered together, create a sound policy incentive for
providers to use business associate services to backup their data. An enormous
expansion of liability to HHS for HIPAA compliance occurred with the addition
of business associates. 68 Providers are now allowed to share responsibility and
thus the overall cost of a breach with their subcontracted associates. 69 Security
of a provider’s ePHI will increase because now the backup services are directly
liable themselves for ePHI violations. Therefore, providers have both monetary
and reputational interest in the matter, which strengthens the overall effort
toward data protection. Additionally, the definitional, liability, and CMP
amendments concurrently allow a health care provider to minimize its
responsibility and financial exposure while shifting a technological function to
an entity far more qualified to handle the task of protecting ePHI.
IV. OFF-SITE DATA BACKUP PROVIDERS
One practice providers should consider adding to their bundle of
cybersecurity methods is using off-site data backup so that, if a provider’s onsite ePHI is hacked, the provider can retrieve or otherwise access the same ePHI
from the off-site backup. In the event the off-site business associate is hacked,
the HIPAA liability for the disclosure in that instance belongs to the third
party. 70 Using business associates and particularly off-site data backup services,
a health care provider’s liability regarding the nature and extent of a breach to
ePHI during a ransomware attack could be limited substantially by controlling
how much access to ePHI the hacker ultimately achieves and how much
bargaining power the hacker has over the hospital. By preventing an excessive
breach using the data backup services, the health provider has certainly
minimized the legal, practical, and policy-based consequences it would incur
from the attack.
The use of contracted associates—such as data backups and cloud services
to store electronic data—is an ongoing trend in health care as well as other

66. Id.
67. Id. § 17938.
68. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (proposed Jan. 25, 2013) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5639.
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industries. 71 But not all providers maintain off-site data backups. 72 The lack of
use of such measures could be due to lack of awareness of changes in liability
exposure due to the Omnibus amendments, costs of using such a security
provider, or a health care provider opting to follow an alternative storage method
such as a paper system. 73 Regardless of the reason health care providers did not
use a business associate before, the changes to the HIPAA Omnibus Rule and
HITECH Act indeed indicate they should use one now for data backup. In
regards to their services for health care providers, data backup providers furnish
frequent backups of ePHI which is continually updated and stored at an off-site
location. 74
From the perspective of a hospital’s functionality during a cryptoransomware attack, having a backup of data is an enormous strategic advantage.
As previously explained, a crypto attack encrypts the user’s data making it
unusable until the owner of the files pays a ransom. 75 However, if the provider
has opted to use an off-site business associate, then it has a non-ransomware
infected version of its records at the ready and can leave the hacker with the
encryption key for the hacked files. 76 This action would be okay, assuming the
provider was already implementing its encryption practices for the ePHI. 77 Thus,
using this method, the provider would access its backup system, and even if the
hacker removed his encryption from the initial attack, the hacker could not
access the files because they still maintain their base security encryption placed
on the data by the health care provider.
Beyond the functional advantages of using an off-site data backup system,
there are huge monetary and reputational benefits for health care providers to
consider. First, during a ransomware attack, a hospital will lose a significant
percentage of its functionality if it cannot access its files. 78 Doctors are unable
to see patients, operations cannot be performed, and even administrative
functions are blocked because critical records are being held to ransom. By
having an at-the-ready backup system in place, it is essentially like the attack
71. Anne DiNardo, Healthcare Data Centers: Carrying the Load, HEALTHCARE DESIGN
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.healthcaredesignmagazine.com/trends/architecture/data-centerscarrying (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
72. See id.
73. Id.; see 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5575.
74. See EMC HEALTHCARE SOLS., TRUSTED IT SOLUTIONS FOR HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS:
BEST PRACTICES FOR HEALTHCARE PRIVACY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 5 (2014),
https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12709-trusted-it-solutions-healthcare-wp.pdf.; see
generally SYMANTEC, SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 10 (2009),
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-security_and_privacy_for_health
care_WP_20934020.en-us.pdf.
75. See supra discussion Part I.
76. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
77. Id.
78. Zurkus, supra note 1, at 1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

328

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:317

never happened. A hospital can resume its normal operations and lose little to
no money as a result. 79 Moreover, the provider is able to protect its reputation
related to providing quality, confidential health care and protecting patient data.
As a result of the recent uprising in cyberattacks on the health care sector, patient
trust has taken a significant hit because of consumers who feel providers are not
taking adequate steps to safeguard their personal information. 80 A provider that
shows it has thought carefully about and developed strong cybersecurity
measures against hackers will preserve, and arguably gain more, reputational
value and clients because of a demonstrated dedication to patient privacy.
A comparative study of two hospitals, one of which implemented the
practice and one of which did not, demonstrates the practical advantages to be
gained from using an off-site data backup service. 81 In early 2016, a cryptoransomware attack known as “Locky” hit Hollywood Presbyterian Medical
Center located in Los Angeles. 82 The attack crippled the hospital’s functionality
when it took computers offline for over a week. 83 Because Hollywood
Presbyterian did not have off-site data backup, the hospital felt it only had one
option, and the board eventually decided that it was in its practical and
reputational best interest to pay the ransom of $17,000 in an untraceable
currency known as Bitcoin. 84 Shortly after the Hollywood Presbyterian attack,
another crypto-ransomware attack hit San Diego-based Alvaredo Hospital. 85 A
representative for the hospital later claimed because of Alvaredo’s robust offsite data backup, it did not have to pay the ransom or even negotiate with the
hacker. 86 Instead, it was able to turn to its backup data, resume regular hospital
functions, and terminate communications with the hacker. The hospital’s
spokesperson and several analysts agree it was the off-site data backup that
saved Alvaredo hospital the day of the attack. 87
Two critical observations emerge from this comparative study. First, the
hospital that did not have any form of data backup fell prey to ransomware and
was forced to pay a ransom to resume standard revenue-generating and lifesaving hospital functions. Alternatively, Alvaredo Hospital maintained strong,
consistent data backup and, as such, did not even need to negotiate with the

79. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
80. Asha Saxena, 6 Ways Hospitals Can Ease Patients’ Fears About Security Threats,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (May 26, 2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-infor
mation-technology/6-ways-hospitals-can-ease-patients-fears-about-security-threats.html
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2017).
81. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
87. Id.
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hacker. Alvaredo had its defense procedures in place, and as a result, avoided
functional and probable reputational losses similar to those Hollywood
Presbyterian faced. Second, Alvaredo hospital did not just have data backup—it
had off-site data backup. The off-site element is critical because ransomware
may move through different interconnected networks within a single provider
location encrypting the data as it goes along, including backups. Information
technology scholars have suggested this is exactly what happened to Hollywood
Presbyterian as the result of not having an off-site copy of their data they could
revert to. 88 When comparing these recent events, the practicality of hospitals
having a business associate that runs an off-site data backup center becomes
apparent. Having such a backup ensures the hospital is ready for future
ransomware attacks and that the hospital can continue to operate as planned
providing safety to its patient’s well-being, continuing revenue-generating
functions, and protecting its reputation in the private sector as being able to
protect ePHI safely.
V. THE LEGAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND POLICY-BASED ADVANTAGES AFTER THE
AMENDMENTS
The benefits that flow from the use of business associates after the HIPAA
Omnibus changes are numerous and will be discussed in terms of their legal,
functional, and policy advantages, beginning with the practical legal advantages.
A.

The Legal Advantages Stemming from Increased Penalties and
Definitional Changes

The readjusted CMPs for ePHI violations present primary legal advantages
to using off-site data backup associates. The annual financial cap for breaches
of ePHI has increased to $1.5 million. 89 The increase per violation means
providers should be more incentivized to develop policies that could implicate
that penalty, including crypto-ransomware attacks. CMS considers the four-tier
structure when assessing what level of penalty to apply. 90 Thus, a provider will
be fined less in instances where it demonstrates the breach was the result of a
reasonable cause rather than willful neglect of the issue. 91 Moreover, CMS
significantly diminishes the penalties for providers who correct a violation
caused by willful neglect within thirty days. 92
88. Id.
89. Wilkes, supra note 4, at 1228.
90. Id.
91. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2016).
92. Id. Per HHS guidance, correction of a violation includes a “notification of the breach to
affected individuals, the Secretary, and, in certain circumstances, to the media. In addition, business
associates must notify covered entities if a breach occurs at or by the business associate.” HIPAA
Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–414; see also Breach Notification Rule, U.S.
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Another set of legal advantages comes from additional definitional changes
in the amendments, mainly that of what constitutes a “breach” of ePHI and the
newly assigned shared legal liability for business associates. To review,
violations of the Omnibus amendments have largely been expanded to cover any
“risk” of ePHI disclosure. 93 Additionally, the Omnibus amendments expanded
who was legally liable to HHS for such breaches. 94 Now, the business associates
themselves are directly responsible for their violations. 95 These definitional
changes mean providers and associates alike should take additional steps in
developing their cybersecurity defense plans by working together through a
shared liability framework.
When considering these various amendments, an off-site business associate
can vastly minimize the cost for a provider in several ways. First, with newly
tiered levels of penalties, the off-site contracted services would markedly
demonstrate the provider has not exercised willful neglect of the issue of
ransomware attacks. 96 Given the prevalence of ransomware attacks in the health
care sector today, it would seem tough for a provider to argue they were not
aware they could be a target for such a situation. Thus, the defensive action
would help push a provider’s penalty into the lower “reasonable cause” tier.
Second, the expansive definition of breaches implores providers to use offsite backup. Because hospitals and providers are now liable for even a “risk” of
compromised ePHI, the best strategy is to nullify that risk by using an off-site
business associate. 97 Crypto-ransomware spreads through the network of
information at a facility’s location, encrypting the data. 98 However, if the
provider has previously encrypted its data, they have not reached the “risk”
threshold in this phase of the cyberattack. 99 By having an off-site backup of the
data, the provider leaves the hacker with double encrypted data: one base
encryption by the hospital and one by the hacker. 100 The hospital can resume its
functions without paying a ransom, similar to Alvaredo Hospital. 101 This added
layer of protection ensures the provider will not have to work with the hacker to
restore the hospital to standard functions, a factor which would undoubtedly
weigh in on CMS’ evaluation of whether there was a risk of compromised ePHI.

DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breachnotification/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.402(1)(ii) (2011).
98. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
99. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 7.
100. Id. at 7–8.
101. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

FINDING AN UNLIKELY COMBATANT IN THE WAR AGAINST RANSOMWARE

331

The next legal advantage to consider from subcontracting ePHI to an offsite business associate is shared liability between both providers and contracted
business associates. Because business associates are now directly liable for
breaches of ePHI, a provider who uses an off-site data backup service has
significantly diminished the CMPs it would have otherwise paid for a business
associate’s violation. This liability sharing mechanism appears to be an effort by
the legislature to aid the health sector by allowing coalition efforts with the
technology industry to protect patient data. Because hospitals are overburdened
with numerous health-related challenges, it makes sense for a provider to
outsource such a highly technical task so that the provider can focus on the actual
quality of care for its patients. The many benefits of this trend, and the simple
principle of wanting to share liability rather than wholly assume it, demonstrates
yet another reason providers should adopt the practice of contracting with an
off-site data backup business associate.
Another legal benefit to consider is the number of private civil liability
claims a hospital will avoid by being able to immediately resume function and
patient care during a ransomware attack. By having an off-site data backup
system in place, the hospital can continue its normal operating procedures and
thus avoid potential harms to patients caused by downed technology systems. It
is purely hypothetical to guess what could happen to patients inside of a hospital
that suddenly loses its ability to treat, but the possibilities range from minor
inconveniences such as scheduling confusion, to fatal outcomes. For a hospital
to combat the systematic shutdown of its operations and avoid numerous civil
lawsuits, it should have an off-site data backup system ready for when a cryptoransomware attack strikes.
When considering the newly increased $1.5 million civil monetary penalty
cap, the four-tiered penalty structure, and the expanded definitions regarding
what constitutes a breach and who is liable for such a violation, the legal
advantages to a provider contracted with an off-site data backup provider are
evident. The contracting health care entity can diminish the likelihood it will
ever even reach the cap by reducing the tier of possible penalty by developing
and implementing a robust cybersecurity plan against ransomware attacks.
Additionally, using off-site backup allows the provider to avoid negotiations
with a hacker, and also consequently diminishes the likelihood of even a “risk”
of compromising ePHI. Moreover, because of shared liability with the data
backup provider, the provider may rest a little easier knowing it does not share
the full pot of the penalties and that a job which calls for highly skilled
technological knowledge is left to the sector best equipped to deal with such an
issue. Finally, a provider can avoid harsh civil legal liability by being able to
functionally maintain the level of care it provides to patients before a
ransomware attack occurs.
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The Functional Advantages Stemming from Being Able to Resume
Revenue-Generating Operations

A health care provider may generate money in numerous ways, but a base
point is undoubtedly its ability to attract, admit, and treat patients. 102 A cryptoransomware attack cripples a provider’s technology and thus can shut down the
processes that generate revenue. 103 In some instances, these periods have lasted
weeks and even longer for providers who refuse to pay the ransom. 104 The costs
of a major hospital being shut down for hours are tremendous in and of
themselves, and those costs multiply exponentially when systems are shut down
for months or weeks. Another issue to consider is that even if the provider pays
the ransom, it still does not know if the hacker will turn over the data as promised
or just demand more money once he has found a willing negotiator. Having an
off-site data backup business associate precludes the need to negotiate or
consider paying the hacker’s ransom demand.
By being able to quickly resort to an off-site data backup during a
ransomware attack, the provider is advantaged functionally two-fold. First, it
can continue to serve its ultimate purpose, which is to provide quality health care
for those who need it. Without patient data, operating systems, and the ability to
use medical technology in procedures, a hospital becomes more of a boarding
location rather than a treatment facility for illnesses and diseases. Not only is the
providence of medical services hindered but also the administrative duties of
physicians and staff are profoundly burdened. One report from the AC Group
indicates typical administrative responsibilities take physicians double the time
to perform when systems are down. 105 This translates into additional cost
considerations for the hospital’s board when deciding whether or not to pay a
ransom. The off-site backup allows physicians and medical staff to continue
providing the highest level of care available because they are still working off
the patient’s known medical history and treating the patient with up-to-date
medical technological devices. Additionally, it allows physicians to limit their
time performing administrative duties which translates into more time for patient
treatment and ultimately more revenue. 106
The second functional advantage stems from the actual revenue flow of the
provider itself. A hospital that can resume operations will not lose any revenue
due to changes to its ability to care for patients that otherwise would have
generated money for the hospital. It is the equivalent of any other business being

102.
Patient
(2008).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Patrick A. Rivers & Saundra H. Glover, Health Care Competition, Strategic Mission, and
Satisfaction: Research Model and Propositions, 22 J. HEALTH ORG. MGMT. 627, 629
Meiling, supra note 6, at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Zurkus, supra note 1, at 7.
Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
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completely shut down for a day. A company cannot make money if its doors are
not open for the services it provides. A study by the Ponemon Institute estimates
just one minute of downtime could cost a health care organization an average of
$7,900. 107 The inability to make money from crippled data systems is likely why
Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital decided to pay the nominal $17,000 its
ransomware hacker was demanding after the hospital’s operations were shut
down for weeks. 108 This enormous price difference between what ransomware
hackers are demanding and what the hospital may lose in revenue, unfortunately,
incentivizes hospital boards to pay the ransom in order to protect the viability of
the company. However, having an off-site data backup grants the provider a
firmly rooted defensive strategy against such an attack, because functional
revenue loss no longer exists as a consideration for negotiating with a hacker.
Instead, the hospital resumes operations as if nothing ever happened.
Practically, it is also important to ask who is better equipped to deal with
complicated ransomware software, the technology or medical sector. In addition
to the daily demand on health care providers, developing top of the line
cybersecurity systems can prove to be both a costly and timely endeavor. 109
Alternatively, business associates such as cloud and data backup providers have
been focusing the bulk of their resources and attention on developing practices
to combat ongoing cybersecurity threats. 110 Beyond the fundamental knowledge
gap between the options of internally developing backup servers or outsourcing
the activity, providers also must consider the cost of retaining all their electronic
patient records in-house. Data servers are not cheap, and providers gain new
patients every day while also having a duty to keep old records. 111 When
considering maintaining a live backup of data, that provider must be aware it
needs enough server space for two copies of an ever-growing collection of
medical records.
There are also a number of practical factors to consider for health care
providers assessing whether to establish their own data center or to outsource
the function. First, the provider must evaluate how much size capacity they will
require based on how many patients it treats. Additionally, the provider must
consider how long certain cybersecurity options take to implement. For instance,
a cloud storage option could be established much faster than off-site data

107. Zurkus, supra note 1, at 8.
108. Meiling, supra note 6, at 16.
109. DiNardo, supra note 71.
110. How Safe is Online Backup?, DATA BACKUP & ONLINE STORAGE, http://www.databack
uponlinestorage.com/Online_Backup_Services_How_Safe (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); Sara
Angeles, Cloud vs. Data Center: What’s the Difference?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:49
AM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4982-cloud-vs-data-center.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2018).
111. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(j)(2) (2009); see ALA. ADMIN. CODE § 42-5-10-.03(33) (2011).
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backups but may not provide the same degree of security for the ePHI. 112 Yet
another consideration is where to place the data center. Some providers may
elect to have on-site data storage while other will choose off-site options. Either
option will require substantial use of real estate and could quite possibly require
further construction and spending by the provider. Finally, a vital consideration
for providers is whether or not to lease the data security services. Establishing
such a contractual relationship would not only allow the provider to fall under
the newliability laws regarding business associates, but also could turn the data
center into an operational cost rather than a capital cost. 113 This is because the
provider is not spending its own money to construct a data center but is rather
investing in monthly payments. 114
Amongst all these considerations there are also practical disadvantages for
providers who establish their own live data centers. The most obvious is that if
ransomware can affect the provider’s primary data set of ePHI, it likely could
reach its backup as well, and thus the advantage of having separate party data
backup becomes apparent. The knowledge and infrastructural disadvantages a
health provider faces in maintaining an internally developed and stored data
backup system demonstrate the technological complexities providers face in
protecting patient information. For instance, in 2015 alone, 362,000 new forms
of ransomware were identified, averaging 1,000 new versions of the virus per
day. 115 Not only is the health care industry facing the ransomware threat daily,
but it is also likely facing a new form of the virus every time an attack is
attempted. HHS gave health care providers a tool to tackle those technological
disadvantages by encompassing subcontractors who work with ePHI as business
associates of providers. 116 By subcontracting the specific technical work of ePHI
backup to a dedicated expert entity, providers can focus on the functions of their
knowledge and expertise, creating a stronger and more secure health care system
for everyone.
The Omnibus and HITECH amendments grant health care providers
enormous functional advantages when electing to contract with off-site data
backup business associates. A hospital may continue to provide its highest level
of care to patients from functionally being able to use the same systems and data
in treatment. The hospital can also maintain revenue generation from being able
to provide treatment for patients. Further, provider limitations on infrastructure
112. Angeles, supra note 110.
113. Ajmal Kohgadai, Top 5 HIPAA-Compliant Cloud Storage Services, SKYHIGH NETWORKS,
https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/cloud-security-blog/top-5-hipaa-compliant-cloud-storage-ser
vices/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
114. Id.
115. Brianna Gammons, 5 Things to Know About the Rise of Ransomware among Healthcare
Providers, BARKLY (June 2016), https://blog.barkly.com/rise-of-ransomware-healthcare-stats (last
visited Feb. 21, 2018).
116. Kohgadai, supra note 113.
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spending and possessing the requisite technical knowledge also encourage the
use of off-site data vendors to protect ePHI.
C. The Policy-Based Advantages of Maintaining Patient Confidence in the
Provider and Standing Up Against Ransomware Bullying
There are two significant policy benefits for health care providers to broadly
contemplate when deciding whether to incorporate off-site data backup into its
cybersecurity strategy. The first consideration is the overall confidence citizens
have in the health care system and particular providers. The HIPAA security rule
was created to protect patient health information in part because such
information is sensitive and unique to every individual. 117 In order to be open to
physicians and receive proper treatment, people should feel confident their
private (and sometimes embarrassing) information is not exposed to those
outside of the patient-doctor relationship or sold. If patients begin to believe that
personally-identifiable, sensitive health information is at risk of exposure,
people will be less candid when engaging with health care providers. In the
aggregate, this effect could lead to fewer routine health checkups, higher rates
of illnesses, and more costly courses of treatment to diagnose problems.
Regarding particular hospitals, patients are less likely to choose a hospital for
treatment if they know it has previously failed to protect patient health
information. 118 This policy effect broadly leads to fewer patients seeking
medical care, which is detrimental to both public health and the provider’s
revenue stream. 119
With off-site data backups, providers can avoid the policy issue of patient
confidence. Although resulting in a data backup and leaving the hacker with a
key to encrypted information does not exactly recover the ePHI from the
hacker’s possession, it does demonstrate to the patients of that particular
provider that protection of their sensitive information is a priority. Moreover, so
long as the provider was providing baseline encryption for its ePHI, there likely
would not be a breach of data, so the encrypted data is all the hacker can
obtain. 120 By having an off-site backup defense strategy, the hospital projects

117. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 269 (7th
ed. 2013).
118. Juhee Kwon & M. Eric Johnson, The Market Effect of Healthcare Security: Do Patients
Care About Data Breaches? 3 (June 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econinfosec
org/archive/weis2015/program.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2018); FAIRWARNING, HOW PRIVACY
CONSIDERATIONS DRIVE PATIENT DECISIONS AND IMPACT PATIENT CARE OUTCOMES 5 (2011),
https://www.fairwarning.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2011-09-WP-US-PATIENTSURVEY.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Jessica Davis, Ransomware Rising, But Where Are All the Breach Reports?, HEALTHCARE
IT NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ransomware-rising-where-areall-breach-reports (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
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confidence to its patients that it is well equipped to handle technological threats,
allowing the patients to focus on getting treatment rather than where they can go
for care without having their personal secrets revealed. Creating a robust
cybersecurity defense that includes off-site data backups is, therefore,
imperative for hospitals to maintain patient confidence in the course of health
care treatment.
The second major policy consideration is creating disincentives for
ransomware bullying by nullifying the possible monetary gains from such an
attack. As discussed, ePHI has become heavily targeted by hackers because of
its value on the black market due to the vast personal information each patient
file contains. 121 Ransomware attackers have one objective: to hold precious
information captive until some ransom is paid in exchange for its release.
Additionally, hackers know the providers need ePHI to function normally and
to treat patients. Therefore, to end this type of bullying, health care providers
should seek to build cybersecurity frameworks that protect ePHI in a way in
which hackers cannot leverage such information against them.
One of the simplest additions to a provider’s existing cybersecurity structure
would be to add an off-site data backup. 122 This would be a tremendously
beneficial addition to a collection of protections designed to frustrate a hacker’s
ability to obtain ransom payments from a hospital or payments from the black
market for stolen ePHI. For instance, by being able to resort to a carbon copy of
the information taken, the provider no longer has reason to bargain for its
retrieval. Instead, the provider can continue how it was operating as if the attack
never occurred while also leaving the encrypted data with the hacker. Moreover,
if the hospital included data encryption in its protection strategy, the hacker is
equally unlikely to sell the ePHI on the black market. Not being able to quickly
resort to data backup results in hospitals being non-operational for lengthy time
periods, which then leads to needing to negotiate a ransom. This often forces
providers to pay the hacker, which only affirms his and others’ ability to make
money off of such an act. It is in the interest of the health care sector overall to
implement off-site data backups. Presumably, if hackers are continually unable
to get any form of monetary compensation for their actions, they will stop the
attacks or at least shift their focus towards another industry that is less prepared
for such matters. 123
121. Lucas Mearian, Hackers Are Coming for Your Healthcare Records – Here’s Why,
COMPUTERWORLD (June 30, 2016), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3090566/healthcareit/hackers-are-coming-for-your-healthcare-records-heres-why.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
122. Nate Lord, Healthcare Cybersecurity: Tips for Securing Private Health Data, DIG.
GUARDIAN (July 26, 2017), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/healthcare-cybersecurity-tips-secur
ing-private-health-data (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
123. Robert Roohparvar, 5 Industries That Top the Hit List of Cyber Criminals in 2017 (July
18, 2017), http://www.infoguardsecurity.com/5-industries-top-hit-list-cyber-criminals-2017/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2018); David Kidd, Healthcare, Encryption and HIPAA Compliant Systems: How
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To protect patient confidence in the health care system and to put an end to
ransomware bullying in the health industry, providers should utilize off-site data
backup business associates. Doing so takes away the power of the hacker as the
value of the encrypted ePHI he possesses is significantly diminished by the
provider’s ability to quickly revert to an up-to-date copy of the stolen data, and
demonstrates to patients and the public how the provider is treating patient
privacy as a top priority in the modern technological age.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt ransomware attacks are on the rise in the health care
sector. The question is: what will the health care industry do to respond to the
crisis? A robust cybersecurity plan contains several strategies. However, after
the Omnibus and HITECH amendments, one of those strategies should include
using an off-site data backup business associate. The increased CMPs, the fourtiered penalty analysis structure, the expanded definition of what constitutes a
“breach,” and the newly shared legal liability with business associates create
numerous legal, functional, and policy benefits for health care providers that
elect to have an off-site data backup. It appears Congress has granted the health
care sector, through the Omnibus and HITECH amendments, an ally in business
associates, particularly off-site data backup services. It is now left to providers
to choose how to move forward in the war against ransomware and whether to
utilize the benefits accessible from contracting with off-site data backup
business associates.
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